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Abstract One of the stylized facts about the behaviour of time series is that their
volatility exhibits asymmetrical responses to good and bad news. In the case of stock
markets, volatility seems to rise when the stock price decreases and fall when the stock
price increases. This so-called “leverage effect” was first described by Black (Proceed-
ings of the 1976 meeting of the business and economic statistics section, pp 177–181,
1976). The concept is not new and has already been comprehensively studied and
implemented in many volatility models (GARCH and SV) in the form of an addi-
tional parameter in the volatility equation. However, there is no study or a theoretical
explanation of the leverage effect in sovereign credit default swap spreads (hereinafter:
sCDS). In this article, we discuss the possible behaviour of sCDS volatility and explain
it by way of reference to the Prospect Theory by Kahneman and Tversky (Economet-
rica 47(2):263–292, 1979). We estimate a series of stochastic volatility models with
the leverage effect, proposed by Yu (J Econom 127(2):165–178, 2005). In this model,
the “leverage effect” is, in fact, the same as a coefficient of the correlation between the
current return of an asset and its expected future volatility.We show that the effect does
exist and differs across markets. As far as the safe European markets are concerned,
the parameter is negative; in the case of extremely risky economies—it is positive. In
markets of medium risk the effect varies depending on the relationship between the
perceived risk and the value of the sCDS premium.
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Credit default swaps (hereinafter: CDS) are financial instruments that allow the buyer
to protect himself or herself against the risk of the default of his debtor. Sovereign
credit default swaps are a special kind of CDS. In this case, the debtor is the country
the bond of which the investor owns (to be precise: the obligation to possess the
bond was imposed in November 2012, but only in the European market—see e.g.
ISDA 2014). The spread (price or premium—i.e. the amount of quarterly payment
from the protection buyer to the protection seller denoted in basis points) of sCDS
instruments is associatedwith the solvency risk of the country. It can be interpreted as a
forward-looking measure of idiosyncratic sovereign credit risk and as such it monitors
investors’ assessment that a given country might suffer a financial crisis (Calice et al.
2015).
CDS contracts are sometimes compared to insurance. The buyer of the CDS pays a
pre-specified quarterly premium to the CDS seller (or: writer) for protection against a
credit event, i.e. the situationwhen the reference entity is not able to pay its obligations.
There are various types of credit events. In the case of the European instruments, three
kinds of them can be distinguished. A “failure to pay” is triggered by a payment
default by the reference entity, in the amount of at least USD 1 million, on certain
debt obligations after the expiration of any grace period. A “restructuring” credit
event is triggered by one of five specified events impacting on the reference entity’s
obligations, in relation to the amount of at least USD 10 million, and only provided
that it results from deterioration in the creditworthiness or the financial condition of the
reference entity. These events are: reduction in interests payable, reduction in principal
or premium payable, a postponement or deferral of certain payment or accrual dates,
a change in ranking or priority resulting in “subordination”, a change in the payment
currency to any currency that does not qualify as a “permitted currency”. The last one
is a “repudiation/moratorium” credit event, applying only to the sovereign CDS and
triggered either when the sovereign entity repudiates/declares moratorium in relation
to the amount of at least USD 10 million, or when a “failure to pay”/“restructuring”
occurs within 60days after the initial repudiation or moratorium (see also Grady and
Lee 2012, or Kliber 2013).
Most of the studies dealing with the CDS market concentrate on the investigation
of factors influencing the dynamics of the spreads. Calice et al. (2015) showed that
it is possible to decompose the sCDS spread into two components: the stationary
and non-stationary one, where one of the components responds to the shocks to the
underlying bond market, while the other responds to the shocks specific to the sCDS
market. According to most researchers, sCDS premium is mostly influenced by global
variables, unrelated to the economic situation of the country (Longstaff et al. 2011;
Ang and Longstaff 2013; Adam 2013; Augustin 2014 and many others). However,
during crisis periods, domestic factors grew in importance (see for instance: Arghyrou
and Kontonikas 2012; Carlos et al. 2010).
More andmore authors stress the fact that the dynamics of CDS spreads are strongly
affected also by their liquidity. Meine et al. (2015) as well as Lesplingart et al. (2012),
who studied corporate CDS, conclude that the liquidity effect is as strong as the
fundamental determinants of default risk, and that this effect is intensified during the
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subprime crisis. The influence of liquidity on the dynamics of the sovereign CDS was
confirmed by, among others, Adam (2013) or Heinz and Sun (2014), who claimed
that in a crisis period less liquid markets tend to be penalized and suffer from a larger
increase in their sCDS spreads.
In this paper, we also address the problem of assessing the dynamics of the sCDS.
Unlike most scholars, we do not aim at determining the external factors influencing
the spread, but we try to find out whether the volatility of the spread reacts in the
same way to the growth of the spread change as it does to its decline. This asym-
metric reaction of volatility was first described by Black (1976) in the dynamics of
the stocks. Such “leverage” was originally associated with the financial leverage of a
given company, but recently more and more studies have found its existence even in
the case of companies that use no financial leverage at all. The phenomenon has been
implemented in many volatility models (asymmetric GARCH and SV models). It is
incorporated into models as an additional parameter in the volatility equation (e.g.
Glosten et al. 1993) or as a correlation between return and volatility (e.g. Shephard
1996 or Yu 2005), which is estimated. Its sign—positive or negative—signals whether
asymmetry is present in the data.
Although the “leverage effect” has already been widely studied and many theories
explaining it have been developed, to the best of our knowledge there is no paper
exploring the asymmetric behaviour of the CDS volatility.1 Due to the nature of sCDS,
a “financial” explanation of the phenomenon is impossible, butwe can explain it via the
behaviour of market participants. Therefore, we present a simple model of the possible
common behaviour of volatility and returns, based upon the Prospect Theory, and we
formulate hypotheses of the possible interrelations between returns and volatility.
Eventually, we test the hypotheses estimating volatility of several European sCDS
spreads (daily data from the period 2008–2013) with the use of the SV model with
the so called “leverage effect” (Meyer and Yu 2000; Yu 2005). In our approach, the
“leverage effect” is associated with the correlation between volatility and return of the
instrument. In doing so, we have obtained negative, positive and insignificant values
of the parameter, depending on the country being investigated.
The remainder of the paper has the following content. First, we introduce the con-
cept of the leverage effect in the time-series data. Next, in an attempt to address the
characteristics of the sCDSmarket and types of investors and investment strategies, as
well as referring to the Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we present
the theoretical explanation of possible leverage parameter values. Subsequently, we
describe the model used to explore the leverage effect (Yu 2005). In the empirical part,
we focus on the dynamics of the sovereign CDS prices (with the source of data being
Reuters DataStream) over the period of 2008–2013 and descriptive statistics. Finally,
we present the results of the study and develop a ranking of countries based upon the
leverage effect.
1 There are some papers dealing with CDS contracts and financial leverage, but they usually address this
issue on the corporate level. A case in point is the work by Saretto and Tookes (2013), where the authors
investigate the impact of hedging risk through CDS on the company’s capital structure.
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2 Leverage effect: an overview of the literature
The leverage effect in financial asset prices was first described by Black (1976). The
author addressed the characteristic behaviour of the volatility of financial time series
that reacted asymmetrically to good and bad news. It has been observed that volatility
seems to rise as the stock price decreases, and it declineswhen the stock price increases.
This effect was typically attributed to the so-called financial leverage. If a company
issues stocks and bonds, its debt-to-equity ratio changes when the stock price changes
(ceteris paribus). When the stock price goes up, the equity value increases more
substantially than the debt value, and the debt-to-equity ratio decreases. Thus, the
risk affecting the company decreases, and so does volatility. When stock prices fall,
the equity value decreases more substantially than the debt value, and the risk and
volatility associated with the company increase (see also Figlewski and Wang 2000).
However, more and more researchers challenge this financial explanation. For
instance, Aydemir et al. (2007) show that when interest rates and the price of risk are
kept constant, the financial leverage generates little variation in stock return volatility
at the market level but significant volatility at the level of a single company. If inter-
est rates and the price of risk are time-varying, the financial leverage also has little
effect on the dynamics of stock return volatility at the market level in the case of all
companies, except for small ones.
Figlewski and Wang (2000) confirm the existence of the leverage effect for falling
stock prices, but a very weak or no leverage effect for positive returns. Thus, they
suggest putting this effect to the “down-market” category. Glosten et al. (1993) showed
that the results change when we switch to monthly data frequency. In this case, the
unexpected return has negative impact on volatility.
Hens and Steude (2009) used an experimental stockmarket to show that the leverage
effect exists in financial markets, but its origin should not be associated with the
financial leverage of a company. Namely, they demonstrate the existence of the effect
even if the underlying asset does not exhibit any financial leverage at all. Similar
results are presented by Hasanhodzic and Lo (2011). The authors analyze a sample of
all-equity-financed companies from January 1972 toDecember 2008, finding that even
if they do not use a financial leverage, the leverage effect is present in the data. They
suggest several possible explanations of this phenomenon,2 inter alia the behavioural
one (supported, among others, by Hibbert et al. 2008). Since in the case of sCDS the
“financial” explanation of the leverage is impossible, we will utilize the behavioural
Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to explain the possible correlation
sign between volatility and returns in the case of sCDS contracts (see Sect. 4.1).
3 CDS market participants and usage of the instruments
The entities that are the main investors in CDS markets are banks, insurance compa-
nies, pension funds, hedge funds and other asset managers (Zhang 2013). The sCDS
2 For instance: the time-varying expected return hypothesis (Pindyck 1984; French et al. 1987; Campbell
and Hentschel 1992; Chen and Ghysels 2011) or volatility-feedback (Danielsson et al. 2010).
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are used by investors for three major purposes: to manage (hedge) the risk associated
with sovereign debt, to speculate on CDS changes, and to construct arbitrage strate-
gies. An investor can buy protection in the form of CDS to hedge the risk of defaulting
on a bond or other debt instrument. In this way, a CDS is similar to credit insurance.
The entities that use CDS for speculation are most often hedge funds. As the cred-
itworthiness of a country deteriorates, the sCDS spread grows. If an investor decides
that the creditworthiness of that country is better than the one implied by sCDS, he or
she can sell the protection and earn a quarterly premium for the pre-specified period.
If, on the other hand, the investor decides that the creditworthiness of the country is
worse than the one implied by the sCDS spread, he or she can buy the instrument, pay a
relatively small quarterly premium andmake an extra profitwhen a credit event occurs.
Instead of holding the contract, a speculator can also trade it, i.e., buy it for a short
time, withdraw from the contract by selling it to another investor, enter into another
contract with another entity, etc. A detailed model of speculation with CDS and its
impact on the cost of the debt for the borrower is given, i.e., in Che and Sethi (2015).
Unfortunately, there is no detailed information about sCDS traders. Are sovereign
creditors and insurers the dominant players, or is it rather the speculative and arbitrage
traders that dominate in the market? Moreover, we know little about their strategies,
that is whether they trade the contracts, or simply hold sCDS as a kind of protection.
Therefore, it is unclear what kind of empirical behaviour and relationship between
the price level and volatility we should expect. It should depend on the strategy of
investors and their beliefs about the future risk.
4 Leverage in the sCDS market: hypotheses based upon the Prospect
Theory
To explain possible investors’ behaviour we will refer to the Prospect Theory of
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992). According to the authors, decision-making
under conditions of risk can be viewed as a choice between prospects (games). A
prospect (x1, p1; . . . ; xn, pn) is a contract that produces outcome xi with a probabil-
ity pi (p1 + . . .+ pn = 1). The value of the prospect can be expressed in terms of two
scales: π and v. The first scale associates a decision weight π(p)with each probability
p.The decision weight reflects the impact of p on the overall value of prospects. The
second weight assigns to each outcome x a number v(x), which reflects the subjective
value of that outcome. The outcomes are defined relative to a reference point (zero
point in the value scale). The scale v is interpreted as the measure of the value of devi-
ations from the reference point—i.e. gains and losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
What is important for our model is that the decision function is relatively shallow
in an open interval, but changes abruptly near the end-points. As a result, people
can either overweight or neglect highly unlikely events, as well as exaggerate or
neglect the difference between certainty and a high probability. People tend to be
risk-averse when their possible gains have high (or moderate) probabilities, or when
likely losses have small probabilities. People become risk seekers when losses have
moderate probabilities, or when gains have small probabilities (see: Table 1). Thus,
the value function for gains is concave, while it is convex for losses.
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Table 1 Risk aversion and risk seeking, depending on the probability of losses and gains
Gains Loses
High probability Risk aversion: Risk seeking:
People tend to be risk-averse when their
possible gains have high (or moderate)
probabilities e.g.
π(0.8)v(4000) < v(3000).
People are risk-seeking when their
possible losses have moderate
probabilities, e.g.
π(0.8)v(−4000) > v(−3000).
Low probability Risk seeking: Risk aversion:
People are risk-seeking when their
possible gains have small probabilities,
e.g. π(0.001)v(5000) > v(5).
People tend to be risk-averse when their
possible high losses have small
probabilities, e.g.
π(0.001)v(−5000) < v(−5).
Based upon: (Kahneman 2011)
4.1 A simple model of investors’ behaviour in the sCDS market
Since the probabilities of default based on spreads are usually low (see: Table 2), we
postulate that the Prospect Theory could be useful to model hypothetical behaviour
of market participants. Although the Prospect Theory is usually used to describe
the behaviour of individual investors, there are works demonstrating that it can be
applicable also to the institutional ones (see for instance: Olsen 1997).
To make our model simple, we make the following assumptions:
– The process of making a decision whether to enter into the contract is determined
by the implied probability of default (based on the spread value), investors’ opinion
about the credibility of the country, and the value of the spread.
– A transaction can be made when the demand of protection-seekers (and/or spec-
ulators who would buy the contract) meets the supply of the speculators selling
sCDS.
– Excess volatility is generated through extensive trade (see for instance: Lamoureux
and Lastrapes 1990; Kalev et al. 2004; Be˛dowska-Sójka 2014 and many others).
The sCDS premium reflects the probability of credit event. It can be decomposed into
the probability of default (PD) and expected loss (EL) (ECB 2009):
p = EL + PD, (1)
Thus, the growth of the premium can be caused either by the increase in the expected
loss, or by the increase in the default probability.We canwrite the dependence between
the probability of default and the value of the spread in the following way (ECB 2009):
p = PD (1 − RR) , (2)
wherePD is theprobability of default andRR—the recovery rate. Someauthors suggest
that the probability of default and loss given default (which is equal to 1 − RR) may
be cyclically interdependent, i.e. there is a negative correlation between the default
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the changes of 5-year sCDS of selected European economies during the
period: October 2008–October 2013
Variable Obs. no Missing Minimum Mean Maximum SD Skewness Probability of
default (in %)—
an average
1 Germany (D) 1316 0 –13.89 −0.01 19.01 2.13 −0.14 0.553
2 UK (D) 1295 21 –18.89 −0.02 19.12 2.87 0.17 1.046
3 Sweden (D) 1316 0 –27 0.01 64 3.16 0.12 0.683
4 France (D) 1316 0 –29.5 0 25.48 4.05 −0.09 1.073
5 Austria (D) 1316 0 –31.28 0.01 124 5.34 0.64 1.043
6 Czech 1316 0 –60 −0.01 55 6.25 0.41 1.68
7 Slovakia 1316 0 –45 0.01 55 6.39 0.54 2.026
8 Slovenia 1316 0 –45.06 0.18 60 6.89 1.35 2.99
9 Poland 1316 0 –83.9 −0.04 63.9 8.12 −0.81 2.509
10 Spain (D) 1316 0 –75.24 0.06 61.31 10.55 −0.2 3.342
11 Italy (D) 1316 0 –79.99 0.08 89.37 10.84 −0.31 3.3
12 Estonia 1316 0 –110 −0.18 160 11.53 1.3 2.825
13 Iceland (D) 1316 0 –100 −0.57 200 11.66 1.69 6.366
14 Bulgaria 1316 0 –109.85 −0.14 104.75 11.88 0.67 4.221
15 Turkey 1316 0 –120 −0.15 140 12.54 0.45 3.452
16 Hungary 1316 0 –85 0.06 129.45 13.68 2.04 5.608
17 Lithuania 1316 0 –137.5 −0.13 157.5 13.91 0.97 4.586
18 Romania 1316 0 –143.7 −0.13 173.2 14.35 1.06 5.211
19 Ireland (D) 1316 0 –137.21 0.02 101.18 14.6 0 5.52
20 Latvia 1316 0 –170 −0.21 168.85 19.8 0.39 5.89
21 Russia 1316 1 –196 −0.15 285 20.52 1.61 3.83
22 Portugal (D) 1316 0 –199.91 0.2 187.6 24.02 −1.11 7.346
23 Ukraine 1316 1 –800 −0.1 1594.6 68.89 0.9 17.227
24 Greece (D) 1316 0 –1669.3 11.27 4943.9 239.45 −0.34 98.845
Data is sorted by standard deviation. Probability of default is computed assuming 40% recovery rate
rate and the recovery rate over the cycle (ECB 2009). This would imply a positive
correlation between loss given default and the probability of default.
CDS-implied probabilities are risk neutral, and especially in the case of advanced
economies, they are usually higher than physical or real world default probabilities
(as reflected, e.g., in credit ratings). The growth of sCDS spreads may also reflect
expectations of slower economic growth and the need to finance large budget deficits
in an economic downturn. Therefore, sovereign CDSs may also capture the migration
risk of moving to a lower credit rating (ECB 2009).
Let us denote the expected value of the premium payment from the protection
buyer by X and the expected value of the payment from the protection seller in
the case of default by Y . The seller can sell the contract and then he may lose Y
with probability PD = p/(1 − RR), or—if he does enter into the contract—he loses
the quarterly payments X (let us denote them by
∑
p · N , where N is the con-
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tract value) with probability 1 (for the sake of simplicity we omit the discounting
factor). Thus, the investor has to choose between the two contracts of the follow-





v(−N (1 − RR)) and: v(−X) ≈ v(∑ p · N ).
The contract seller will be willing to sell the contract provided that v






v (−N (1 − RR)) , i.e. when he feels that potential loss can be compensated
for by the premium payment, or when he perceives the probability of default as being
unrealistic (too high).
From the point of view of the protection buyer, the situation is opposite. The
buyer can choose not to enter into the contract and lose Y if the credit event occurs.




. On the other hand, if
the buyer enters into the contract, he “loses” the value of the quarterly payments
with probability 1. Thus, the value of the first contract for the protection buyers is:









v (−N (1 − RR)). The protection buyer will be willing to enter into the
contract provided that v




v(−N (1 − RR)), i.e. when
he or she decides that the value of the premium is small enough, or that the probability
of default is high enough. This is especially important, since during market downturns
CDS spreads may increase disproportionately more than the probability of default
owing to the fact that increasing the loss given default multiplies the initial increase
(see Eqs. 1–2 and ECB 2009).
4.1.1 Case 1: Probability of default is very low
When the probability of default is very low, we approach the lower end of the decision
function. Since we are in the negative domain, market participants are risk averse.
Protection-buyers will be eager to avoid the (low) risk of the credit event and would
like to enter into the contract. The seller has the choice to lose the quarterly payments
with probability PD or lose the pre-defined payment in the case of the credit event. If
the value of p declines, the discrepancy between the two possible losses goes up. Thus,
ifπ(PD) > PD, the speculators will not be willing to enter into the contract (this could
explain the very limited activity in the market of the sCDS in developed economies
at the beginning of crisis). On the other hand, if π(PD) < PD, the speculators will
consider the contract an (almost) risk-free investment, and they may be eager to enter
into it. In this situation, we should expect a negative leverage. On the other hand,
when the value of p increases, and so does the perceived probability of default, the
speculators will remain risk-averse until PD departs from the lower end of the decision
function and p reaches a high enough point.
4.1.2 Case 2: The probability of default is low
This is the most typical situation in the case of the sCDS of the emerging markets (see
Table 2). Let us assume that the value of the spread increases. This may be caused
by the growth of the credit event probability or the loss given default. Now, if the
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protection buyer expects future growth of the spread, i.e. π(PD) > PD, he or she will
be eager to enter into the contract. The demand can be boosted by the speculators eager
to buy the contract in order to re-sell it in the future. The speculators will increase the
demand and cause the more intensive movement of the prices. Thus, we can expect
positive leverage.
On the contrary, if market participants perceive the risk and premium as too high,
i.e. π(PD) < PD, the buyers will wait till the trend reverts. The speculators will be
eager to sell the contracts rather than buy them. The supply can exceed the demand and
the movement of prices will be slow. We should not expect any growth of volatility.
When the spread decreases, we approach the lower end of the decision function.





is very small, and the dis-
crepancy between (1 - RR) · N and ∑ p · N—very high, the seller will be risk averse.
Thus, the protection seller will demand that the value of the spread, p, should be high
enough to compensate for the risk of the potential default. Consequently, if the spread
decreases, and the protection seller perceives the probability of default as higher than
the implied from the spread, he will be reluctant to enter into the contract. However,







1−RR . Also in this case we can expect
that the decreasing price could encourage buyers to enter into the contract, so the
transaction number can grow and volatility can increase. Here, the leverage parameter







1−RR , the protection seller would
wait until the spread increases in such a way that its growth will compensate for the
increased growth of the default probability (see Eq. 2).
4.1.3 Case 3: Probability of default is high
CDS-implied probabilities of default are usually low or moderate. However, as in
the case of Greece, they can increase drastically in extreme situations. Under such
circumstances, as we are still on the loss side, the market participants become risk-
seeking. Thus, especially with respect to growth of spreads, speculators will become
active and increase the demand, despite the fact that the probability of default they
perceive is smaller than 1. When we consider the protection buyer, we observe that
he either loses N (1 − RR) with high probability PD or loses ∑ p · N with certainty.
Because of that, he will be willing to enter into the contract only when he feels that
PD is higher than the market says. And so, in the case of sCDS with very high spreads,
we can expect a positive leverage. If the spread declines, and the market participants
consider probability of default to be higher, the risk-seeking protection buyers can
postpone transactions, while the speculators can consider the premium too low to
compensate for the high risk of default. Thus, in this case we should not expect any
growth of volatility.
4.1.4 Summary
To sum up, we postulate that as far as the countries with very small probabilities of
default are concerned, we should expect only a negative correlation between spread
123
226 A. Kliber
changes and volatility. In the case of the economies exhibiting a low probability of
default, the negative correlation should be observed when the probability of default is
underweighted, while positive, when it is over-weighted Eventually, with extremely
high probabilities of default, the observed correlation should be positive. In the next
step of our research, we will try to verify our hypotheses using a volatility model with
the leverage effect.
5 Volatility models with the leverage effect
The so-called ”leverage” phenomenon can be visualised through various GARCH-
type models (Bollerslev 1986), e.g. the EGARCH (Nelson 1991), the GJR-GARCH
(Glosten et al. 1993), or the APARCH (Ding et al. 1993) one. In these models, their
authors introduced an additional parameter to the volatility equation that translates the
effect of falling prices into volatility dynamics. The specification is flexible enough to
model a positive, negative or no leverage.
In our study, we decided to use stochastic volatility models (SV), which are more
flexible than the GARCH ones, and we estimated them using the Bayesian methodol-
ogy. There were two reasons for doing so: first, the modelled period was hectic (the
financial crisis), and secondly—we modelled returns of the series instead of the loga-
rithmic returns. In this case, the interpretation of the resulting data is straightforward
(daily changes of the spread), but the properties are not the same as in the case of
the log-returns used in stock data models. Therefore, we needed a tool that is flexible
enough to capture the dynamics of the series.
5.1 Stochastic volatility model with the leverage effect
SVmodels are usually specified in terms of stochastic differential equations (Yu 2005):
{
dst = σt d B1,t ,
d ln σ 2t = α + β ln σ 2t dt + σvd B2,t , (3)
where B1,t and B2,t are two Brownian motions. In order to make sure that the condi-
tional variance is positive, the logarithm of σ 2t is modelled. This is the basic SVmodel,
as proposed by Melino and Turnbull (1990) and Taylor (1994). In order to enable esti-
mation, the model is discretized. For instance, the Euler–Maruyama approximation
produces the following result:
Xt = σt ut,
ln σ 2t+1 = α + φ ln σ 2t + σvvt+1, (4)
where: Xt = st+1 − st , ut = B1,t+1 − B1,t , vt = B2,t+1 − B2,t , φ = 1 + β.
This formulation of themodel is somewhat similar to theGARCH(1, 1) proposition.
Contrary to the GARCH model, there are two sources of randomness here: ut and vt .
The first disturbance describes the randomness connected with the content of new
information inflow, while the second—with its intensity. Therefore, the models are
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more flexible than the GARCH ones and can shape volatility of a hectic time series
more appropriately.
Similarly to GARCH-type models, SV models can also incorporate asymmetry. Yu
(2005) proposed to model it through correlation between E[ln σt+1|Xt ] and Xt :
corr(B1,t , B2,t ) = ρ. (5)
When ρ < 0, we have the (negative) leverage effect. In the discretized form: ut and
vt are iid N (0, 1) and corr(ut , vt+1) = ρ.




] = α + αφ





4(1 − φ2)2 +
σ 2v α




Thus, a fall in the return leads to an increase of E[ ln σt+1|Xt ]—ceteris paribus—and
the leverage effect is ensured.
This model is consistent with the one proposed by Shephard (1996). Harvey and
Shephard (1996) estimated the model by QML, while Yu (2005) used the Bayesian
approach in WinBUGS3 software. The advantage of the Bayesian approach over the
maximization of the likelihood function is that we avoid a problem of algorithm
stacking in local extreme. In order to estimate the model in WinBUGS, it needs to
be rewritten to the state-space representation. We followed the approach of Yu (2005)
and wrote it in the following way:
ht+1|ht , α, φ, σ 2v ∼ N (α + φht , σ 2v ),










−α − φht ) , exp (ht ) · (1 − ρ2)
)
,
where ht = ln (σ 2t ). The parameterρ was assumed to be uniformly distributed over the
(−1, 1) interval. All other priors were specified as in (Yu 2005)—i.e. this is the same
specification as in Kim et al. (1998). This representation allows for straightforward
estimation using WinBUGS. We chose a 5000-iterations burn-in period and a 20,000-
iterations follow-up period. All the models were well estimated based on the obtained
values of the MCMC error, as well as autocorrelation of the samples.
The model was estimated in two steps. First, we fit the model of conditional mean
to the returns of sCDS in order to explain all linear dependencies in the data. Next, for
the standardized residuals, we estimated the SV model.
3 The BUGS (Bayesian inference Using Gibbs Sampling) project is concerned with flexible software for
the Bayesian analysis of complex models using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods (in short: MCMC).





We take into account the 5-year daily sCDS spreads of selected European economies
during the years of 2008–2013, traded in euro. Our sample comprises both emerging
and developed countries. The countries were chosen based on the availability of data.
We present the descriptive statistics of the sCDS returns (changes) in Table 2. (D)—
denotes developed economies according to the IMFclassificationup toNovember 2013
(International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook 2013). The data are sorted
according to their standard deviations. Greece seems to be the most volatile, although
we took into account a longperiod duringwhich therewere no transactions of theGreek
CDS and their price remained stable. In the last column we present the average prob-
abilities of default computed under the assumption of 40% recovery rate (see Eq. 2).
In Figs. 1, 2, 3 4, 5 and 6, we present the evolution of spreads. We divided the
countries into groups, depending on the similarity of spreads dynamics. And thus,
the Baltic states and Iceland are presented in Fig. 1. We observe that the reaction
of the spreads to the beginning of the crisis was strong, but the situation stabilized
already in 2010. The spreads of Turkey and Russia almost overlap (Fig. 2), especially
in the period 2009–2013. The spread of Romanian CDS reacted stronger to Greek
problems. The spread of Ukrainian sCDS was similar in dynamics, but took much
higher values (Fig. 2). In the case of Visegrád Group and Bulgaria (Fig. 3), we observe
that the reaction to the beginning of the crisis was stronger than to the 2010/2011
crisis in all countries but Hungary. However, Hungary experienced its own problems





2008-10-08 2009-10-08 2010-10-08 2011-10-08 2012-10-08 2013-10-08
Lithuania Latvia Estonia Iceland
Fig. 1 The evolution of the sCDS spread of the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and Iceland
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Romania Turkey Russia Ukraine
Fig. 2 The evolution of the sCDS spread of Bulgaria, Romania, Russia (left axis) and Ukraine (right axis)
over the period 2008–2013
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Fig. 3 The evolution of the sCDS spreads of Visegrád Group economies (the Czech Republic, Hungary,
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08-10-2008 08-10-2009 08-10-2010 08-10-2011 08-10-2012 08-10-2013
France Germany Austria UK Sweden
Fig. 6 The evolution of the sCDS spread of developed economies (France, Germany, UK, Austria, and
Sweden) over the period 2008–2013
behaviour of the Slovenian CDS spread was more similar to the behaviour of the
Mediterranean countries than to the central-European ones. We placed Portugal and
Greece together with Ireland in Fig. 5. Ireland and Greece also confronted their own
problems, although the spread of Ireland was 10 times lower than the Greek one and
the situation stabilized in 2012. However, in the case of Greece, the transactions ceased
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and the spread remained constant. Eventually, France, Germany, Austria, Sweden and
the UK are presented in Fig. 6. Yet, we observe that the reaction of France and Austria
to the Greek problems was much more spectacular than the German one or the British
one.
7 The leverage effect: the study
7.1 The results
In Fig. 7 and in Table 3 we present the estimates of the leverage effect.We demonstrate
the mean and the 95% confidence interval. When the lower and upper interval values
are greater than zero, we conclude that the parameter was positive. When both values
are negative—we conclude that the parameter was negative. In all the other cases, we
assume that it is insignificant.
The obtained results support our hypotheses. Let us first distinguish the cases of very
low and low p. In the group of very low premium we have safe, developed economies:
Germany, France, Austria, Sweden, UK (Fig. 6; Table 2). The maximum value of p in
this group of countries amounted to 160bp in the analysed period. In all other cases,
such value was the minimum one. To the low-spread group we can classify also the
Czech Republic and Slovakia. Indeed, in the case of UK, Germany, Sweden, Austria,
and theCzech Republicwe obtained the negative leverage parameter. In all other cases,
the leverage parameter was zero. According to our model, the negative leverage can
be present in the sCDS of very low probability of default if the market participants
feel that this probability is, in fact, lower than the one implied by the spread. In the last
column of Table 3 we present the estimates of the slope parameter (b1) of the trend
equation that was fit to the spreads. In the case of the negative-leveraged sCDS, the
trend was declining. This fact can support our thesis that the investors perceived the
probability of default as lower than the actual one, if we assume that the movements










2.5 percenle median 97.5 - percenle
Fig. 7 95%-confidence interval of the leverage effect parameter
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Table 3 The “leverage effect” in the European markets: the characteristics of distribution and resulting





2.50% Median 97.50% Leverage
sign
b1
Estonia −0.683 0.022 0.000 −0.725 −0.684 −0.637 − −0.304
Iceland −0.6586 0.0239 0.0005 −0.7031 −0.6593 −0.6095 − −0.544
UK −0.3415 0.0333 0.0004 −0.4058 −0.3413 −0.2756 − −0.046
Austria −0.3388 0.0365 0.0006 −0.4089 −0.3393 −0.2665 − −0.032
Sweden −0.2398 0.0354 0.0004 −0.3083 −0.2400 −0.1694 − −0.049
Latvia −0.147 0.039 0.001 −0.222 −0.148 −0.069 − −0.554
Bulgaria −0.146 0.039 0.001 −0.222 −0.146 −0.068 − −0.232
Germany −0.1394 0.0356 0.0005 −0.2088 −0.1398 −0.0683 − −0.015
Czech Republic −0.123 0.035 0.000 −0.191 −0.123 −0.055 − −0.065
Romania −0.100 0.043 0.001 −0.182 −0.101 −0.014 − −0.204
Ukraine −0.096 0.038 0.001 −0.172 −0.097 −0.021 − −1.373
Lithuania −0.081 0.037 0.000 −0.153 −0.081 −0.009 − −0.335
Slovakia −0.061 0.036 0.000 −0.130 −0.061 0.009 0 0.023
France 0.010 0.040 0.000 −0.069 0.010 0.088 0 0.016
Ireland 0.048 0.047 0.001 −0.044 0.048 0.139 0 0.076
Russia 0.062 0.061 0.002 −0.057 0.063 0.180 0 −0.276
Italy 0.066 0.055 0.001 −0.042 0.066 0.176 0 0.166
Hungary 0.075 0.048 0.001 −0.019 0.075 0.168 0 Insignificant
Spain 0.075 0.057 0.001 −0.034 0.076 0.188 0 0.165
Turkey 0.079 0.061 0.002 −0.041 0.079 0.197 0 −0.146
Portugal 0.1082 0.0424 0.0007 0.0256 0.1092 0.1901 + 0.507
Poland 0.119 0.049 0.001 0.022 0.119 0.215 + −0.083
Greece 0.3955 0.0544 0.0017 0.2837 0.3971 0.4980 + 15.541
Slovenia 0.606 0.027 0.001 0.551 0.606 0.657 + 0.228
b1 denotes the coefficient of the trend equation: y = b0 + b1t
In the case of low-spread countries, the positive value of the leverage was obtained
in Portugal, Poland and Slovenia. The assumption that the perceived probability of
default was higher than the one implied by the spread can be easily justified in the
case of Slovenia. If we take a look at Fig. 4, we can see that the changes of the spread
of Slovenian sCDS featured almost the same patterns as the changes of the Spanish
and Italian spreads. Although the Slovenian rating was high and stable, investors
were unlikely to trust the implied probabilities and they could not have expected that
sCDS spread was undervalued. The fact that the premium of the Slovenian sCDS
was increasing over the period in question supports this thesis. In the case of Poland,
the investors could have been afraid of the spillovers from unstable Hungary, the
neighbour economy. If we take a look at Fig. 3, we notice similarities in the evolution
of the spreads of Polish and Hungarian sCDS (the Czech Republic, on the contrary,
could be associated more with the Slovak Republic, which had already been a member
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of the Eurozone, and the spread of which was lower than the spreads of the remaining
V4 economies). The parameter b1 estimated for the sCDS trendwas negative; however
when we look at Fig. 3, we can see that it was definitely reverting. Finally, in the case
of Portugal, the trend was upward, the rating was deteriorating, and the investors were
likely to expect that Portugal might follow the Greek scenario.
As for the groupof low-spread economies,wehave seven cases of the negative lever-
age, namely: Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and Lithuania. In
the case of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Iceland, the spread was downward-sloping
in almost the whole period. The foreign-currency rating of Estonia changed from A to
BBB in April 2009 and again to A in July 2010. The rating of Iceland at the beginning
of the period was equal to BBB; in January 2010 it changed to BB and improved to
BBB in February 2012. In the case of Latvia, the rating was changed to BB from BBB
in April 2009 and again to BBB inMarch 2011. Furthermore, in the case of Lithuania,
the foreign currency rating was BBB over the whole period. Since according to the
rating, the countries should be considered safe, the speculators most likely perceived
the probability of credit event as lower than implied by the spread. The fact that the
spread was declining in the whole period supports this thesis as well.
In the negative-leverage group we have also Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine. The
ratings of Romania and Bulgaria provided by Fitch were BBB in the whole period,
while the spreads of Romanian and Bulgarian sCDS were indeed higher than, for
instance, the spread of Russian sCDS of the same rating. Moreover, the trends of
sCDS were downward-sloping. Thus, the spreads were likely to appear mispriced by
the investors.
The rating of Ukraine provided by Fitch did not exceed B—neither in local, nor
in a foreign currency. However, the spread was declining in the whole period, resem-
bling the pattern observed in Romania, Turkey and Russia (Fig. 2). Therefore, despite
the high values of the spread, the investors could perceive the actual probability of
default as lower (the slope coefficient was, indeed, negative). Our sample ends in
2012. Already in 2013, when the situation of Ukraine greatly deteriorated, the market
participants did not expect the default.4
Finally,we have one case of a very high probability of default—Greece. The average
probability of default in the case ofGreece amounted to 98%, sowe can definitely put it
in the “high probability of default” category. The trendwas upward sloping, suggesting
that the investors most likely perceived the real probability of default as higher than
the one implied by the spread. The leverage parameter was positive, confirming our
hypothesis.
8 Summary
In this article, we discussed the theoretical justification of a leverage parameter in
the case of sovereign credit default swaps, referring to investment strategies and the
4 Reuters, December 10th, 2013: “The situation is bad and the market knows it. We do not expect a 2014
default in our base case, and neither does the market (. . .),” Bank of America/Merrill Lynch said in a note
(http://www.iol.co.za/business/international/ukraine-cds-surge-to-4-year-high-1.1620142).
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behavioural attitude to risk. The leverage was modelled as a correlation coefficient
between the return of sCDS and its volatility through the SV model with a leverage
coefficient (Yu 2005). We proposed a behavioural explanation of the possible positive
and negative correlation between returns and volatility, utilizing the Prospect Theory
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). According to our model, in the case of countries with
very low probabilities of default, we should expect only a negative correlation between
the spread changes and volatility. In the case of economies with a low probability of
default, the negative correlation should be observed when the probability of default is
underweighted, and the positive correlation—when it is over-weighted. And finally, in
the case of the extremely high probabilities of default, the observed correlation should
be positive.
As regards the economies with a very low probability of default, we obtained only
negative correlations (UK, Germany, Sweden, Austria, the Czech Republic). In the
case of extremely risky Greece, the parameter was positive. Furthermore, in the case
of moderate-risk economies the correlations varied.We obtained a positive leverage in
the case of Poland, Portugal and Slovenia and we explain this result by claiming that
the probabilities of default could have been underpriced in these cases. The spreads of
Polish and Slovenian sCDS were growing over the whole period, or over most of it.
Thus, if we assume that the market was effective, these tendencies could suggest that
the market participants expected that the spreads should be higher. Besides, in each
case the market participants might have been afraid of spillovers from the suffering
neighbour economies (Hungary in the case of Poland, and Greece in the case of
Slovenia and Portugal).
In the case of negative-leveraged economies from the moderate-risk group (the
Baltic states, Iceland, Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine), we observe the decline of
the spreads over the period. This could suggest that the market participants expected
further decline of the probabilities of default and considered the spreads overpriced.
Moreover, in most cases the ratings of specific countries suggested good or stable
economic conditions (apart from Ukraine). Thus, the results confirm our thesis.
On the other hand, our analysis is not free of drawbacks. First of all, we assume
that the volatility of sCDS is impacted only by own returns of the instruments. This
does not have to be the case. Undoubtedly, the dynamics of financial instruments are
influenced by the dynamics of other financial instruments. In the case of sCDS, such
instruments could be sovereign bonds or the sCDS of neighbouring countries. For
instance, Kliber (2014) shows that the correlation between the returns of Polish and
Hungarian sCDS was influenced by the Greek problems. The growth of the sCDS
premiums at the beginning of the crisis was also a result of the panic in the market. In
such a case, the growth of volatility could be correlated with the extreme positive or
negative returns in the neighbouring sCDS or the bond market.
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